

# Pakistan and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation: Five Decades of Strategic Engagement



# Author

**Faizan Rashid** is a Research Associate at the Centre for Security, Strategy and Policy Research (CSSPR). Faizan is a mechanical engineering graduate from the National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST). He had previously worked as a Management Trainee at Shan Foods and as an Assistant Manager at Packages Limited. His research interests lie in environmental and public policy, climate change, and regional connectivity.

© The Center for Security, Strategy and Policy Research 2021

The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of CSSPR or UOL.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or any information storage or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder.

Please direct all enquiries to the publishers. All imagery in this report is licensed under Creative Commons 2.0 from Unsplash.com, with thanks to all the photographers.

# CSSPR

**The Centre for Security, Strategy and Policy Research (CSSPR)** is an autonomous policy research center housed in the University of Lahore (UOL), Lahore. It aims at generating research on issues relating to contemporary security and strategic aspects that affect Pakistan's domestic security environment and its international relations with other countries of the world. The Center aims to generate research-driven and nuanced discourses on how best to address security and strategic challenges that deny Pakistan the opportunity and ability to play its role as a responsible seventh Nuclear Weapon State in the world.

The Center conducts research, publishes, and holds conferences on a broad range of regional and international security, strategic, peace and conflict issues. Through this Center, we aim to establish national, regional and international linkages and collaborate with universities, think tanks, research institutes and eminent scholars from around the world, enabling national and international scholars and our students to use CSSPR's platform to deliberate upon issues that carry a global impact.

## Center for Security, Strategy and Policy Research (CSSPR)

1-Km Defence Road  
Lahore  
Email: [csspr@siss.uol.edu.pk](mailto:csspr@siss.uol.edu.pk)  
[www.csspr.uol.edu.pk](http://www.csspr.uol.edu.pk)

---

## University of Lahore (UOL)

1-Km Defence Road  
Lahore  
Email: [info@uol.edu.pk](mailto:info@uol.edu.pk)  
T: +92 423 2233888  
[www.uol.edu.pk](http://www.uol.edu.pk)

# Table of Contents

Introduction.....	2
OIC: An Intergovernmental Body (4-Tier Analysis).....	4
OIC: An Experiment in IR.....	4
OIC and Conflict-Resolution: Four Case Studies.....	7
Pakistan and Bangladesh.....	7
Egyptian Reintegration into the Islamic Fold.....	9
Iran-Iraq War.....	9
Afghanistan (1980s and 1990s).....	10
Joint Foreign Policy and the Kashmir Dispute.....	12
Technical Cooperation on Pakistan's Part.....	16

# Pakistan and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation: Five Decades of Strategic Engagement

“And hold fast, all together, unto the bond with God, and do not draw apart from one another,” is the Quranic injunction incorporated in the emblem of the OIC.

## Introduction

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is an international organization that currently comprises 57 member states that are predominantly populated by Muslims. The OIC “is the collective voice of the Muslim world... as it endeavours to safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony.”<sup>1</sup> A unique entity in modern times, the OIC stands as the second largest intergovernmental organization after the United Nations based on coreligionist aspirations, as it claims representation of 1.9 billion Muslims of the world and the global Islamic community, the Ummah.

The OIC - sometimes referred to as the ‘Muslim United Nations’- was founded on the expression of a pan-Islamic edict that called for an ideational subscription to unification of Muslim peoples transcending current geographical, racial, political, and ethnic divisive antecedents.<sup>2</sup> It appeals to the Muslim Ummah to find a larger identification as a global community through the formal organization and synergy of its governments and leaders. The OIC occupies a unique position in the international nation-state system, as the OIC eschews all misgivings and apprehensions that restrict religion as an informal sub-element of inter-state politics and international relations.

The evolution of the Muslim world represents a long and complex history, covering more than 50 heterogeneous states (city-states, traditional monarchies, republics, etc.). Initial agglutinating events that laid the foundation of broader Muslim states' collaboration include: the gathering of Muslim intellectuals from all corners of the world at the Third Islamic Conference at Jerusalem in 1931 followed by a conference in 1954 between Muslim leaders, in which a bill was approved for that purpose. A nationalistic revolutionary process in the 1950s galvanized broader Muslim polities. It started after the outbreak of a secular, nationalistic revolution in Egypt led by former President Gamal Abdel Nasser that sporadically spread to Syria and Iraq where single party regimes that advocated for modernization and social reforms formed militarized republics. This process slowly started to unfold as the nationalistic states, whether monarchies or republics, failed to bring in the promised modernization i.e. growth with real development. Consequently, complicated by further issues of corruption, transparency, lack of democratic reforms, and economic underdevelopment – political nationalism lost ground in many Muslim countries.

Galvanized by global sentiments in the immediate aftermath of the criminal arson executed at the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem on August 21, 1969, the leaders of the Muslim world organized the first Islamic Conference in Rabat, Morocco, in September 1969. The main objective and outcome of the Conference was to unanimously declare solidarity with the Palestinians and to show commitment to promoting religious harmony, cultural interaction, and economic cooperation between Islamic countries. This fervour of pan-Islamism was taken forward by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, who convened the first Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Jeddah in March 1970, to discuss the problems of the Muslim world in a public forum.

Led by Islamic, socialist, communist, and nationalistic forces, the Iranian Revolution's broad social and political implications brought disparate groups together. It presupposed an alternative to the previously-operating power structures, advocating for swift transformation and reform. Consequently, political changes were initiated by many Islamic governments to curtail the flurry of revolutions.

This is where pan-Islamism provided an answer to the conservative structures of the existing monarchies and political nationalism. Oligarchies, regimes, and monarchies found in Islam the political legitimacy they had hitherto lacked.

Muslim majority states began collaborating and cooperating with each other on international forums to promote broader common interests. Beginning with the Arab Maghreb Union, the African Union, and the Arab League, Muslim states came together under the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Decades later, they changed the Organization's emblem and name and, thereafter, became the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Now, with a membership of 57 member states, the OIC is open to all states that consider themselves predominantly Muslim. The OIC has granted "Observer" status to many Muslim communities and entities in the world including the Turkish Cypriot Muslims, Moro Islamic Liberation Front of the Philippines, and states that have sizeable Muslim populations like Russia and Thailand. The OIC not only has 22 members of the Arab League as founding member states, but it also includes several significant non-Arab member states in Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. The OIC's Constitutional Charter is aimed at building solidarity among its members so as to promote a positive image of Islam, prevent its defamation, and strive to achieve sustainable development and harmony among its member states. Much like other intergovernmental organizations, the OIC upholds state sovereignty and respects territorial integrity. These goals have ensured that "the Palestinian Question" is at the forefront of nearly every Islamic conference. Other agendas have included the illegal occupation of Kashmir, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The OIC's internal structure consists of three bodies: the Islamic Summit Conference (a Conference of Kings and Heads of State and Government), the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM), and the Secretary-General of the Organization. The Islamic Summit Conference is considered the foremost authority of the OIC, as it directly comprises heads of state and creates strategies in accordance with the Organization's vision. The Islamic

Conference of Foreign Ministers is dedicated to implementing the said policies and creating the frameworks for executive collaboration. The General Secretariat of the OIC is elected by the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, to represent the OIC at other international platforms. The OIC did not set up its own judicial organ till 1987 when the then Islamic Summit approved the draft statute of the International Islamic Court of Justice (IICJ).

Against this backdrop, it is important to analyze Pakistan's relations with the OIC over the last five decades since the Organization's inception, with a view to understanding how successful the country has been in leveraging this forum. This report aims to understand OIC's genesis, its role as a mediator for peace in relation to Pakistan, its effectiveness in formulating a consentient joint foreign policy, and support for technical cooperation through a four-tier analysis.

## **OIC: An Intergovernmental Body (4-Tier Analysis)**

### **OIC: An Experiment in IR**

War is one of the most fundamental problems in international politics. It has been a primary factor motivating the creation of IGOs, such as the League of Nations and the U.N in the twentieth century. But unlike the League of Nations or the United Nations (UN), the OIC - consisting of 57 member states, with a collective population of over 1.9 billion – is unique in nature and legitimacy from other IGOs of the world. The OIC's member states are already a part of the Arab League (founded in 1945), the Arab Maghreb Union (founded in 1988), the Council of Arab Economic Unity (founded in 1964), the Gulf Cooperation Council (founded in 1981), the Economic Cooperation Organization (founded in 1985), the Turkic Council (founded in 2009), the Economic Community of West African States (founded in 1975), and the Liptako–Gourma Authority (founded in 1970). It was founded on the premise of “enhancing and consolidating the bonds of fraternity and solidarity among the Member States.”<sup>3</sup> The OIC provides a space for representation of the global Muslim identity at the global fora, but, unlike the U.N, the OIC does not hold global legitimacy due to its limited membership. Almost all member countries have avenues for regional and multilateral collaboration. The OIC, on the other hand, provides the space for geographically-disparate Muslim-majority countries to engage with each other outside of regional organizations and mechanisms.

To understand the OIC, it is essential to analyze the theoretical foundations that helped form the Organization. Functionalism is one critical theory that seeks to explain the rise of IGOs in the international community. Functionalism is rooted in the belief that governance arrangements arise out of the basic, or functional, needs of people and states. Staunch functionalists, however, assert that international economic or social cooperation is a prerequisite for political cooperation and eliminating wars whose causes lie in poverty, ignorance, hunger, and disease. Functionalism has been touted as a mechanism to understand the early development and rise of IGOs, classifying them based on specific mandates, links to select issues, and limited memberships.

The OIC occupies a unique position in the international nation-state system, as the OIC eschews all misgivings and apprehensions that restrict religion as an informal sub-element of inter-state politics and international relations

Unlike a pure liberalist or realist model, the founding states of the OIC were brought together under the premise of a collective response in the wake of the immediate shock and anger that swept the Muslim world after the failed attempt by an Australian fundamentalist Christian, Michael Rohan, to set alight the Al-Aqsa Mosque on August 21, 1969 in Jerusalem. Immediately after, King Hassan II of Morocco convened a conference on September 22 in Rabat, to discuss the failed arson attack. The conference paved the way for the spread of a web of international activities and interactions, through which the interests of the founding nations were gradually integrated. Between 1961 and 1975, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was the first forum in which the Arab states and their allies sought broad support for the Palestinian cause. At its first summit, the NAM declared its support for “full restoration of all the rights of the Arab People of Palestine.” The NAM endorsed the struggle for liberation in 1964; it accepted the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians in 1973 and as a full member in 1975, and, in 1979, it affirmed the need for a Palestinian state.<sup>4</sup> But Arab support failed, however, to get the NAM to support efforts to challenge Israel’s membership in the UN. Instead, the NAM affirmed Israel’s right to exist at its 1970 summit. Though many Arab states and Muslim-majority countries made an effort to build a united front against the developed countries at this forum and, by extension, at the UN, their efforts were not fruitful. The OIC’s creation in 1969 and the inclusion of a larger Muslim membership provided a more suitable platform “to co-ordinate efforts... and support of the struggle of the people of Palestine...”<sup>5</sup> The NAM had not provided a clear platform for cooperation in non-political, social spheres to satiate the global Muslim population’s

desire for a stronger response to the Palestinian question. The OIC duplicated the actions of the NAM but with a supercharged rhetoric bypassing political rivalries by relying on shared values. These habits eventually spilled over into cooperation in greater economic and military affairs. Functionalism, however, fails to answer whether Islam, in the context of international relations, can be a functional and political issue separately and as to whether Islamic solidarity can insulate functional cooperation from political disputes between member states. Unlike specified intergovernmental organizations that cater to a particular matter, the OIC lacks precise functional directives and instead relies on broadly-defined directives in an effort to be all-encompassing. If the OIC had hoped to build a form of supra-territorial authority on the pretext of global integration in the name of Islamic solidarity, it failed to base it around states' needs and required functions. This would have linked its authority with specific expertise, mediation capability, scientific knowledge, and technology. The OIC also has a habit of taking action on political and military issues rather than sticking to those of a technical and practical nature like functional international organizations, though that can be attributed to the decades of conflict that continues to rage in the Muslim world. Thus, a crisis of identity and foundation impedes autonomous development, expansion, sophistication, and multiplication of functional activities from the OIC. Despite efforts to tackle international problems in a transnational manner, the OIC is anything but uncontroversial politically. Notwithstanding its religion-based origins, the OIC's unique and convoluted identity has hampered prospects for it to achieve success that its contemporaries have achieved.

Another lens to view the foundation of the OIC is the constructivist approach where the OIC's founding states shared beliefs, socially-constructed rules, and cultural practices. At the core of this constructivist approach is a concern for identity and interests and how they can change: a shared belief that norms, values, faith, and ideas matter in our collective understanding of global practices and how the Islamic identity of nation-states is a "socially constructed" identity influenced by culture, ideology, domestic and international interactions. Religion, as a cultural by-product, is heterogeneous, multifarious, and dependent on historically-specific contexts. A publicly-understood standard for action against the arson attack at the Al-Aqsa Mosque may have generated a collective interest – backed by global popular sentiment – that manifested in the convening of the first Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1969. The study of religion in international relations is a subfield in a decades long transition. Secularization theory, a European paradigm of world politics, holds that religious practices and organizations would fall with the rise of economic development. Once bilateral or multilateral cooperation between states begins, the overarching role of religion would fade. But rational reasoning, intellectualization, and modernity did not lead to the gradual 'disenchantment of the world' as Thomas Weber had so eloquently put it. Instead, the OIC stands as an experiment in religious pluralism with a collective identity amongst its member states. Instead of ascribing to division-generating, simplified paradigms, such as Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations", it would be better to approach the role of religion with a reconstructionist approach instead of a revisionist one. Countries within the OIC's ranks have signed multifaceted economic agreements amongst themselves yet, they still ascribe to a shared identity of Muslim values and norms that help to govern their behaviour and shape interests. Secularization

theory will need to account for “multi-faceted modernity” since no single trajectory holds true for every society. The constructivist commitment to religion’s innate heterogeneity leaves much room to think beyond the confines of secularization theory, as state structures and international political actors all interact with religion differently. Constructivists have not explored the implications of how IGOs that share religious identities govern differently. Scholarship on this theoretical question is non-existent because the modern understanding of IR is rooted in the European context. The Islamic nature of the OIC and its role as a purposive actor within international relations merit consideration commensurate with our current set of theoretical tools.

Pakistan, as one of the founding members of the OIC, upholds the charter as a responsible and active member, but the deliverance from the OIC has been inconsistent and fallen short of expectations. The OIC member states’ cultural and resource diversity are a huge asset for the OIC. Further, they are located in strategically-important areas and hold transportation routes. But there are intense demographic dynamics and huge economic disparities between member states that politically complicate the role of the OIC.

## **OIC and Conflict-Resolution: Four Case Studies**

### **Pakistan and Bangladesh**

In 1971, as the civil war erupted in erstwhile East Pakistan, the OIC experts’ Committee meeting was in session at Jeddah, to draft the complete charter of the Organization. Without naming India, the experts’ Committee condemned any external interference in the East Pakistan conundrum. A three-member OIC delegation comprising the OIC Secretary General, Tengku Abdul Rahman, former Prime Minister of Malaysia, accompanied by representatives from Kuwait and Iran, attempted to visit both East and West Pakistan, to mediate for a political solution between the warring groups. When they attempted to establish contact with the self-proclaimed Bangladeshi authorities in India through the Indian Ambassador, their visas were declined on the grounds that the first OIC Summit, held in 1969 in Rabat, had expelled the Indian delegation. Though the Indian government later apologized for the discourtesy shown to the OIC mission, it had succeeded in its immediate objective of torpedoing any initiative that could have jeopardized Indian aspirations for territorial disintegration of Pakistan.

The OIC began a renewed effort after the founding of the independent state of Bangladesh, following the ceasefire between Pakistan and India. Upholding democratic values and “consolidating the unity and solidarity among the Member States”, the OIC entrusted its Secretary General to contact Pakistan’s and Bangladesh’s heads of state to arrange for a meeting between them. Moreover, a delegation of six members of the ICFM consisting of Tunisia, Somalia, Morocco, Malaysia, Iran, and Algeria to bring about “agreement, conciliation and brotherhood between the two elected leaders in an atmosphere of Islamic brotherhood, freedom and dignity” was sent.<sup>6</sup>

The OIC put forward a great show of support and solidarity for Pakistan at the 3rd ICFM in Jeddah, in 1972, as the OIC refused to recognize Bangladesh and declared its full



**Pakistan, as one of the founding members of the OIC, upholds the charter as a responsible and active member, but the deliverance from the OIC has been inconsistent and fallen short of expectations**

---

support for Pakistan's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence. The OIC called on both Pakistan and India to withdraw their troops to peacetime locations, vacate territories captured during the war, and exchange prisoners in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. The Conference established a committee of reconciliation comprising the Secretary General, along with Tunisia, Somalia, Morocco, Malaysia, Iran, and Algeria, to contact the heads of state of both Pakistan and Bangladesh "to bring about reconciliation between estranged brothers."<sup>7</sup>

The Conference expressed its sympathies over the situation in Pakistan and wished that "future relationship between the population in the East (Pakistan) and West (Pakistan) should be decided upon by their elected leaders through a meeting between them in the atmosphere of freedom and dignity."<sup>8</sup> The Secretary General attempted to arrange a meeting between the Bangladeshi and Pakistani leaderships in Mecca during the annual pilgrimage. However, he failed at reconciliation, as the Bangladeshi representative declined to sit next to his Pakistani counterpart until that country officially recognized Bangladesh.<sup>9</sup>

The Secretary General sent a letter of goodwill to Bangladesh through the Indian Embassy in Cairo, since Bangladesh had not been recognized by most Muslim member states and, hence, did not have any diplomatic missions. The Secretary General received a reply from the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that said the Bangladeshi leadership was not in a position to receive a 7-member delegation of the OIC, since the OIC had 'not cared' about the Bangladeshi people's suffering earlier. As such this second attempt at reconciliation also failed.<sup>10</sup>

A year later, Pakistan successfully managed to get a resolution approved at the 4th ICFM held in Benghazi, in 1973, reprimanding India for continued detention of Pakistan Prisoners of War (POWs) while Pakistan had beforehand unilaterally released all Indian POWs in an effort to increase international pressure.<sup>11</sup>

Pakistan's then Prime Minister Z.A Bhutto had to placate an emotionally-charged domestic public that did not want the state to recognize Bangladesh while also needing to deal with the hanging Sword of Damocles of Pakistani POWs still detained in India. The new Secretary General, Hassan Tohami's, efforts bore fruit as PM Bhutto recognized Bangladesh a day prior to the 2nd Islamic Summit held in Lahore, in 1974, in 'the spirit of Islamic solidarity'.<sup>12</sup> The OIC was then finally able to convince Bangladeshi leader, Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman, to attend the Summit. At the auspicious 2nd Islamic Summit, the OIC itself and member states like Turkey and Iran individually recognized Bangladesh. Prime Minister Bhutto never forgot to insist that it was the OIC and the Islamic spirit that made Pakistan recognize Bangladesh, not any external pressure.<sup>13</sup> The second summit was a major victory of the OIC as an intergovernmental body.

Fourteen years later, the OIC again assisted on the issue of the repatriation of the 'stranded Pakistanis' in Bangladesh. The OIC and Pakistan established a trust in 1988, to raise funds for the repatriation and rehabilitation of 238,000 stranded Pakistanis.<sup>14</sup> In 1991, the then

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif chaired another meeting of the OIC Fund which decided to go ahead with the repatriation. The process waned due to the political upheavals of successive governments in the following decade.

### **Egyptian Reintegration into the Islamic Fold**

As one of the founding members of the OIC, Pakistan has gone above and beyond the responsibilities that would suffice for a member state of an intergovernmental organization. As one of its foreign policy objectives, Pakistan prioritizes promoting relations with Muslim countries. Pakistan was instrumental in the readmission of Egypt into the Arab fold and the larger global Muslim community, following its peace with Israel. Diplomatic isolation was not enough for the Arab League and Egypt – a founding member – was suspended. At the OIC front, Egypt was diplomatically-isolated and ostracised by member states while at the Arab League its membership was suspended. Pakistan, on Egypt's behalf, pleaded for the state to rejoin the Islamic fold. Pakistan based its stand on the premise that suspending Egypt did not serve the Palestinian cause or unify the Muslim world. In seeking the re-entry of Egypt to these Muslim forums, Pakistan's then-President Zia ul-Haq stated that "Pakistan was neither taking a partisan position nor was it espousing any particular point of view."<sup>15</sup> Pakistan's effort for the readmission of Egypt into the OIC served as the catalyst for its eventual re-entry into the Arab League.

### **Iran-Iraq War**

In the 1980s, during the Iran-Iraq War, Pakistan stepped up to play its part in conflict resolution under the aegis of the OIC, to end violence and bloodshed. A goodwill mission, led by then Pakistani President Zia ul Haq and then President of the OIC, was formed in the hopes of negotiating between the warring parties. Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq explained the objective of the mission was a "peaceful settlement [of disputes] in the spirit of Islamic solidarity".<sup>16</sup>

The Pakistani President visited both Baghdad and Tehran, to persuade both countries' leaders to resolve their dispute. This attempt did not succeed at persuading the warring parties. Pakistan took part in the Third Islamic Summit Conference (renamed Islamic Peace Committee), which included the original Zia Mission as its nucleus, in 1981, along with the Presidents and leaders of Turkey, Senegal, the PLO, Gambia, and Bangladesh. The Committee called on both parties to cease hostilities and even suggested on forming an Islamic emergency peacekeeping force, one that would be entrusted with the task of ensuring the implementation of the ceasefire, should the need had arisen.<sup>17</sup> Iran had earlier boycotted the Conference, Iraq on the other hand, successfully secured the OIC's approval to host the following Foreign Ministers' Conference in Baghdad.

While the Peace Committee tried its hand to resolve the issues between Iran and Iraq, the UN Security Council had passed Resolution 479, calling for a peaceful settlement of the dispute on September 28.<sup>18</sup> President Zia ul Haq had presented, in his report to the UN General Assembly, that he had conveyed the positions of Iran and Iraq to each other and also notified the Assembly that Iraq had offered a four-day ceasefire. Iran rejected both the

UN Security Council's call for a ceasefire as well as the Iraqi unilateral offer of a four-day ceasefire. Other than the UN, the NAM had attempted to propose peaceful solutions to the conflict. The NAM sent a foreign ministerial delegation to both countries from Pakistan, India, Gambia, and a representative of the PLO. The NAM's peace mission and proposals were not as comprehensive as those of the OIC, and, therefore, failed to make any headway in the peaceful resolution of the dispute.

The OIC's Peace Committee focused on providing mutually-acceptable solutions to the Shatt al-Arab waterway issue as the conflict impinged on the ownership and access to the waterway. The delegation proposed to both parties that the decision on the control of the waterway be left to a committee comprising OIC members mutually acceptable to both Iran and Iraq. The delegation also mapped out a propositional ceasefire date with a timetable detailing the withdrawal of Iraqi soldiers from Iranian territories "under the supervision of military observers drawn from member countries of the OIC."<sup>19</sup> The Peace Committee asserted that the "OIC countries will guarantee the observance by both sides of the commitments undertaken on the basis of the package peaceful settlement and, if necessary, maintain observers on both sides of international frontier for a certain period."<sup>20</sup> Both parties paid no heed to these proposals. Iran isolated itself from OIC proceedings, demanding that the OIC identify and punish the aggressor first. Iraq pragmatically manoeuvred its interest within the OIC's institutional framework by hosting the 12<sup>th</sup> ICFM in Baghdad. Unlike Iraq, Iran had not announced its acceptance of the UN Security Council's Resolution 598 that called for an immediate peaceful settlement. The OIC admonished Iran for not complying with the UN Resolution for "just, permanent and comprehensive settlement of the conflict."<sup>21</sup> The end of the conflict could not be attributed to the efforts made by the OIC since its decision to hold the 12<sup>th</sup> ICFM at Baghdad compromised its role as a neutral mediator in the conflict, depriving it of the leverage that it initially had. This is indicative of how the OIC became a platform for power-bloc politics and failed to peacefully end a war between two member countries.

### **Afghanistan (1980s and 1990s)**

The OIC initially was very much indifferent to the political developments within Afghanistan that took place in the late 1970s. It only sprung to action when Afghanistan was occupied by a non-Muslim power. Afghanistan became an Islamic concern for the OIC, instead of just a political matter.

As Soviet tanks were seen on the streets of Kabul, Pakistan successfully helped convene the first extraordinary session of the ICFM in Islamabad, in 1980, emphasizing its priorities regarding the situation in Afghanistan. The emergency session of the ICFM outright condemned the Soviet invasion and occupation as a violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), the OIC Charter, and the UN Charter. The OIC pragmatically suspended the membership of Afghanistan on account of its being under the regime of Babrak Karmal, and denied to grant Observer Status to the Islamic Alliance. The OIC, through the mechanism of the ICFM, called for the withdrawal of Soviet forces, recommended a boycott of the Moscow

Olympics of 1980, made a global appeal to support the indigenous resistance movement, and appealed to the Muslim states to financially support Pakistan in its efforts to deal with the arrival of the gargantuan number of refugees from Afghanistan.<sup>22</sup> The Conference was apprised of the fact that the Soviet invasion also resulted in "current attempts by certain Western powers to exploit this situation [Soviet invasion] for reintroducing imperialist intervention in the Islamic World."<sup>23</sup> The 'Afghanistan Question' was still at the top agenda of the 11<sup>th</sup> session of the ICFM, which was also held in Islamabad. The Kabul regime offered the option of Soviet withdrawal subject to positive guarantees by the U.S., Iran, and Pakistan that they would not allow access to Afghan territory via Iran and Pakistan. While the U.S. and Iran were sceptical about the proposal, Pakistan rejected it outright.<sup>24</sup>

The 11<sup>th</sup> ICFM took a similar position to the one it had adopted in the previous session: calling for the withdrawal of Soviet forces and a restoration of the Islamic and non-aligned character of Afghanistan. The 11<sup>th</sup> ICFM called for support to the two frontline states, Pakistan and Iran, as both countries hosted a large number of refugees. The 11<sup>th</sup> ICFM formed a committee comprising the OIC Secretary General, Iran, and Pakistan, to seek ways to help with the refugee crisis and offered the OIC's good offices for mediation if required.<sup>25</sup> The Committee did not hold talks with the Kabul regime as the OIC did not recognize it. Another committee comprising Saudi Arabia, Gambia, and Pakistan was formed to administer the finances gathered from the OIC's Afghanistan Fund. OIC's response to the invasion of Afghanistan and its aftermath was a collective effort that supported Pakistan's policy regarding the matter. Nearly all Muslim states broke diplomatic relations with the Kabul regime, symbolically boycotting the Moscow Olympics and raising funds for Afghan resistance groups. The U.N General Assembly session adopted a resolution condemning the Soviet armed invasion by a majority of 111 votes. By the time of the 3rd Islamic Summit in Taif, Saudi Arabia, in 1981, the OIC Committee had been enlarged to include Tunisia and Guinea. The Committee attempted to propose to the Soviet Union to initiate a dialogue with the OIC, but the request was turned down. Pakistan looked to the OIC not only for financial support to feed millions of Afghan refugees but also for political succor as Soviet aircraft had begun regular bombardment of Pakistani territory by 1984. The 15<sup>th</sup> ICFM held in Sana'a, in 1984 "deeply deplored the violation of Pakistani air space and bombardment of its territory...resulting in loss of life and property" and expressed appreciation for the restraint the Pakistan had shown in this situation.<sup>26</sup> Pakistan took a pragmatic step of involving the OIC in the Afghan crisis.

As Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev decided to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the OIC welcomed the UN-brokered Geneva Accords in 1988 and all of its several agreements. As the political situation in Afghanistan deteriorated from 1989 until 1992, the OIC repeatedly offered its good offices to all the warring factions and the interim governments, to broker agreements. But, unfortunately, OIC couldn't prevent the civil war that culminated with Kabul falling to a Mujahideen-led coalition government in 1992. The 1993 Islamabad Peace Accord, brokered after the failure of the earlier Jalalabad and Peshawar Accords, had failed and, hence, gave the OIC the mandate to monitor the prospective ceasefire. A special OIC Permanent Mission on Afghanistan was established in Islamabad in 1994, to oversee talks with Afghan leaders.<sup>27</sup> As the situation deteriorated

in Afghanistan, the United Nations and Pakistan requested the OIC to play a mediatory role between all Afghan parties. A second OIC initiative, the Tehran Talks, from November to December 1994, also failed to resolve the issue. Once the Rabbani-led regime was ousted in 1996, the 24<sup>th</sup> ICFM decided to declare the Afghanistan seat at the OIC vacant once again. Despite the OIC's decision to keep the Afghan seat vacant, Pakistan hosted a Taliban delegation at the Islamic Summit held in March 1997, in Islamabad, but only as an observer. The OIC wanted to remain a mediator between the Taliban-led government and the Northern Alliance. The OIC was successful in co-chairing four talks between them with the aid of the UN, but, despite making significant progress, negotiations eventually broke down. The OIC's role in Afghanistan became less and less relevant over the decades after the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent two-decade long War on Terror in Afghanistan, as the U.S. and Pakistan were at the forefront of all political settlements and negotiations.

### **Joint Foreign Policy and the Kashmir Dispute**

An intergovernmental organization is liable to develop a coherent foreign policy utilising its executive machinery among member states. Homogenizing the individual foreign policies of member states into a joint one representing the collective will of the organization requires a consentient agreement. Unlike the NAM, UN or regional IGOs, the OIC has a common ideological bedrock among its members which allows for the organization to bridge the gap between the foreign policies of member states. The jury is still out on the effectiveness of the OIC as the collective representative of the Muslim countries since strife between members impedes the legitimacy and authority of the Organization. Though the OIC achieved success in regard to the issues of minority Muslims in Bosnia, Philippines, and Chechnya, the OIC has had an unsteady approach to the Kashmir issue between a founding state, Pakistan, and India.

Since their independence in 1947, the Kashmir dispute has been the biggest bone of contention between India and Pakistan. The dispute is pending resolution in accordance with the Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Mutual distrust eventually resulted in a war in 1948 with Pakistan securing several districts of what became Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). The UNSC brokered a ceasefire. Passing two Resolutions in 1948 and 1949, the UN called for an immediate ceasefire, demilitarization, and a plebiscite in the region to determine the wishes of the Kashmiri people about acceding to Pakistan or India. New Delhi based its claim on Kashmir on the Instrument of Accession of a former Hindu ruler of a Muslim-majority Kashmir, who fled in the insurgency of 1947. Attempts to resolve the Kashmir dispute by the use of force became the precursor for the 1965 war between India and Pakistan. Later, after the 1971 war, the Simla Agreement was signed by both parties, to resolve the Kashmir dispute amicably. Since the Agreement, both countries have engaged in political talks, limited conflicts, and boycotts. India had been invited to attend the first summit of the OIC in 1969, in Morocco, but, the Indian delegation's invite was withdrawn after Pakistan's objection.<sup>28</sup> This decision proved costly, as the OIC was not able to exercise agency over India on matters relating to Kashmir.

Unlike the NAM, UN or regional IGOs, the OIC has a common ideological bedrock among its members which allows for the organization to bridge the gap between the foreign policies of member states

The Kashmir issue was first formally brought up at the OIC forum at the 3<sup>rd</sup> ICFM. At the 2<sup>nd</sup> Islamic Summit that was hosted by Pakistan in the city of Lahore, Pakistan was still reeling from the loss of East Pakistan and was, thus, unsure of gaining enough popular support to get a resolution on Kashmir adopted. Pakistan's leadership pragmatically made the President of AJK attend the summit to meet leaders of the Muslim world.<sup>29</sup> As simmering tensions slowly morphed into mass uprisings in 1989, Pakistan found the pretext needed to compel the OIC to take action. The then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto met with sixteen leaders of Muslim-majority countries to garner support before the 19<sup>th</sup> ICFM that was to be held in Cairo.<sup>30</sup> A diplomatic victory for Pakistan was achieved when the OIC expressed deep concern over human rights violations in Kashmir and adopted a resolution calling upon both South Asian states to resolve the matter in accordance with the relevant UNSC Resolutions. India rejected the OIC's good offices and mediatory role by saying that Kashmir was a settled issue.<sup>31</sup>

Pakistan again wrote to the OIC Secretary General in 1991, hoping to draw the Organization's attention further to the violence being perpetrated against the Kashmiris. That year, at the 20<sup>th</sup> ICFM in Istanbul, the Conference reiterated the salient points of the previous resolution while calling upon the Secretary General to send a fact-finding mission on the ground in Kashmir to assess the situation of the Kashmiri people.<sup>32</sup> New Delhi shrewdly rejected visas of the OIC's fact-finding mission on the grounds that the mission had no legal standing on Kashmir. The mission then visited AJK in 1993. The OIC's fact-finding mission interviewed displaced persons, refugees, and victims of atrocities perpetrated by the Indian forces. The mission presented its report to the OIC at the 21<sup>st</sup> ICFM in Karachi, in 1993, detailing body mutilation, inhumane torture, gender-based violence, unprovoked firing on unarmed protestors, and custodial killings by the Indian occupation forces.<sup>33</sup> At that time, the Secretary General of the OIC recommended Muslim countries to support the Kashmiri people's right to self-determination, impose a ban on the Indian labour force working in the Gulf Muslim states, review their trade ties with India, and call on India to end the brutal atrocities, in his report at the ICFM.<sup>34</sup> In response, Ishrat Aziz, the Indian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, met the Secretary General to convince him of New Delhi's reasoning for rejecting visas to the OIC mission and reiterated India's desire to have good relationship with Muslim states.<sup>35</sup>

The OIC continued exploring possible avenues to support the Kashmiris as prospects of Pakistan-India peace talks were getting dimmer. The then Pakistani Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, while attending the UN Human Rights Conference in Geneva, in 1993, proposed a UN fact-finding mission to go to IIOJK to ascertain the violence that was being perpetrated against the Kashmiri people and sought the OIC support in tabling a resolution.<sup>36</sup> India, in turn, requested the OIC not to press for a Pakistan-proposed UN mission and, instead, welcomed a visit of OIC envoys stationed in India to Jammu and Kashmir. This compromise found success, but Pakistan demanded that the OIC decide the composition of the mission and not India. At the 22<sup>nd</sup> ICFM, the OIC, for the first time, invited Kashmiri leaders from both sides of the Line of Control (LoC) to an OIC proceeding. But before the scheduled 22<sup>nd</sup> ICFM was held, Pakistan convened an extraordinary session of the ICFM (later called the 7<sup>th</sup> EICFM) at Islamabad in September 1994, in light of the rising violence in IIOJK. The

Conference unanimously demanded that New Delhi cease orchestrating state terror and called for the establishment of an OIC Contact Group on Kashmir. Pakistan's expectations from the OIC were again met when the OIC formally made a special declaration on Kashmir at that extraordinary session. The OIC espoused the same consensus as Pakistan did, arguing that the issue should be resolved "on the basis of the United Nations resolutions."<sup>37</sup>

Later, Pakistan attempted to table a resolution from the OIC platform in the First Committee of the U.N General Assembly. Diplomatic manoeuvring by both India and Pakistan to dredge up support for their stands began, but fearing a lack of popular support, Pakistan dropped the idea. To Pakistan's benefit, the OIC Contact Group continued to criticise isolated incidents of human rights violations against Kashmiri Muslims.<sup>38</sup> New Delhi claimed that the OIC's postures were part of a well-planned effort to interfere in the domestic affairs of India and continued its own rhetoric that Kashmir was a settled issue. India's rhetoric has been that the OIC was swayed by streams of Islamabad-orchestrated disinformation and propaganda campaigns.

As tensions between the two South Asian neighbours increased due to the Kargil war, the OIC was the only international forum that supported the Pakistani position on the matter. At the 26<sup>th</sup> ICFM held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in June 1999, the Conference sympathized with Pakistan over the escalation caused by Indian air strikes and shelling, condemned India for its failure to uphold UN Resolutions on Kashmir, and asserted Pakistan's right to safeguard its territorial integrity during the week long war. At the 29<sup>th</sup> session of the ICFM, in Khartoum, Sudan in June 2002, meeting of the OIC's Contact Group on Kashmir renewed the OIC's stand on achieving self-determination for the Kashmiri people. The ICFM called on the OIC Secretary General to appoint a Special OIC Representative on Kashmir.<sup>39</sup>

Throughout the decade, the OIC reaffirmed Pakistan's view on the Kashmiris' right to self-determination in a stream of ICFM conferences. The ICFM forum regretted that India hadn't responded to the OIC offer of utilizing its good offices for discussing the Kashmir issue, expressed concern on the indiscriminate use of force, called upon its member states to persuade India to cease human rights violations, and urged India to allow the OIC's fact-finding mission to visit Kashmir. The establishment of the Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission (IPHRC) helped create a formal mechanism to continually monitor the human rights situation in Jammu and Kashmir and report back to the OIC Contact Group. The ICFM reaffirmed the findings of three OIC-led missions to Azad Kashmir in 2007, 2008, and 2011 regarding the Kashmiri refugees' experiences of extra-judicial executions, enforced disappearances, and fake encounters carried by the Indian Armed Forces.<sup>40</sup> The OIC also passed resolutions on the then prospective peace process between India and Pakistan, supporting confidence-building measures (CBMs), supporting the efforts of the Government of Pakistan for a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute, and urging India "to remain engaged in a meaningful and sustained dialogue process with Pakistan".<sup>41</sup> By 2017, the OIC had formally begun denouncing the farcical election held in IIOJK under duress. It became more critical of Indian Army's brutalities and India's attempts to change the demographics of the region by settling in non-native non-Muslim citizens.<sup>42</sup>

Pakistan-India relations and, coincidentally, Pakistan-OIC relations plummeted to new lows in 2019 due to the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis in February of that year. Concurrently, the most profound breach of good faith between the OIC and Pakistan came at the 46<sup>th</sup> session of the ICFM at Abu Dhabi, where India's External Affairs Minister (EAM), Sushma Swaraj, was invited as a 'guest of honour' by the UAE. "History was made that day", announced the Indian Representative. This development was important since it was the first time in 50 years, India attended an OIC summit.<sup>43</sup> When Pakistan's appeal to the OIC to rescind the invitation to India was paid no heed to, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi refrained from attending the plenary session. The OIC convened an emergency meeting of the Kashmir Contact Group, calling for immediate de-escalation in the region and condemned Indian violations of Pakistani Airspace. This could be deemed as an effort to make amends for inviting the Indian top diplomat, earlier.

Animosity between the two nuclear-armed states exacerbated as a result of the unilateral abrogation of Articles 370 and 35-A of the Indian Constitution whereby Jammu and Kashmir lost its special status. This event marked a turning point in the Kashmir dispute as eight million Kashmiris were put under a security lockdown and communications blackout by the Central Indian Government starting August 5, 2019. Pakistan began a multifaceted campaign to internationalize the Kashmir issue in an effort to draw the international community's attention towards the deteriorating humanitarian condition of the Kashmiris wilting under a brutal military siege.

In the midst of this humanitarian crisis, Islamabad looked to OIC leader, Saudi Arabia, to put together a strong OIC mandate on Kashmir. Despite the history of support, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf bloc's restrained approach on the matter turned into a major problem. Pakistan's Foreign Minister demanded that Saudi officials call a meeting of the OIC to discuss the Kashmir issue and place more pressure on India. According to FM Qureshi, if Saudi Arabia was unwilling to do so, then Pakistan would look elsewhere for regional support.<sup>44</sup> Saudi Arabia responded to this tenable ask by demanding a cash-strapped Pakistan to urgently repay a \$3 billion loan.<sup>45</sup> On the back of growing economic, military, and strategic ties between India and the Gulf countries, the latter's support to the Kashmir cause and Pakistan was a tad piecemeal. This created a degree of ill-will between Pakistan and the Gulf countries. India's bilateral trade with Saudi Arabia was around USD 27 billion in 2020, while Pakistan-Saudi trade stood at USD 3.6 billion.<sup>46</sup> Indian expats in Saudi Arabia now outnumber Pakistani expats with 2.8 million Non-Resident Indians (26.3% of the migrant population) living in Saudi Arabia while 2.6 million Pakistani live in Saudi Arabia (24.2% of the migrant population).<sup>47</sup> This, coupled with Pakistan's earlier refusal to send troops as part of the Saudi-led coalition to Yemen back in 2015, Pakistan's willingness to partake in the 2019 Kuala Lumpur Summit, and Pakistan's positive relations with Iran, ostensibly tilted the balance of support in favour of India. Though the OIC did not back India's brazen actions, its rather less vociferous support to the Kashmiris was but disconcerting.

India, now a vital trading partner for the Gulf, had enough clout in the Middle East that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States had little to offer to the beleaguered Kashmiris, even in the face of mounting Indian oppression. Instead of putting up a unified front and channelizing

opprobrium, the Riyadh- led bloc provided subdued support for Kashmir. Weeks after India had annexed IIOJK, the UAE presented the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi with its highest civilian award. Riyadh's security-centric strategic stakes in Pakistan may have caused a rethink, as the OIC reaffirmed its support for Kashmir, adopting a forceful and comprehensive resolution, and calling out India for its illegal acts in the occupied territory at the 47<sup>th</sup> session of the ICFM in November 2020. Pakistan will host the 48<sup>th</sup> session of the ICFM and has also become a member of the OIC Executive Committee for three years, starting from November 2020.

Despite the OIC being a pluralist initiative of Muslim-majority countries, Saudi Arabia, on account of being the custodian of the two Holy sites, is largely cited as having the most diplomatic sway and clout within the Organization. The OIC established its secretariat in Jeddah, which enabled King Faisal to claim that Saudi Arabia was *primus inter pares* among Muslim states (the OIC had been holding triennial summits in different Muslim capitals since then).<sup>48</sup> This had given Saudi Arabia and, by extension, the Gulf bloc leadership of the OIC which only recently came under threat at the 2019 Kuala Lumpur Summit. Despite the decades-long list of pronouncements, communiqués issued by the Islamic Summits and resolutions adopted in annual sessions of the ICFM, OIC's consistent, dependable support for the Kashmir cause has been called into question as a result of recent fissures in the Muslim world that threaten long-held status quos with new blocs and alliances. Pakistan needs to pragmatically navigate all conduits and pathways within this structurally-fractured organization to champion the Kashmiri struggle successfully.

### **Technical Cooperation on Pakistan's Part**

The Third Summit Conference of the OIC in 1981 established three ministerial committees and each is headed by a member state at the presidential level. These are: the Standing Committee for Information and Cultural Affairs (COMIAC) headed by the President of Senegal, the Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation (COMCEC) headed by the President of Turkey, and the Standing Committee for Scientific and Technical Cooperation (COMSTECH) headed by the President of Pakistan. Each Committee is entrusted with following up the implementation of the resolutions of Summit Conferences in its respective area and devising new strategies to promote cooperation. Pakistan, as a responsible member state of the OIC, has led the Organization in the field of technical cooperation through the functional framework of COMSTECH. The broader objectives of COMSTECH include assessing the technological and research needs of member states, fostering indigenous development, building the capacity for cooperation, and creating an effective institutional structure for R&D. The OIC hopes that collaborative research and data-sharing will help resolve issues of common concern, like agricultural productivity, desertification, waste management in Jordan, agro-climatology in Pakistan, laser applications in Kuwait, and biological conservation in Brunei.<sup>49</sup>

Under the leadership of the Pakistani President, some of the programmes initiated by COMSTECH include Literature Search Service, establishment of Inter-Islamic Networks, institution-building, travel support, training courses, and research grants. Through joint

research grant programmes with institutions including the Inter-Islamic Network on Water Resources Development and Management (INWRDAM), the Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office of the World Health Organization (WHO/EMRO), the World Academy of Sciences (WAS), Islamic Scientific, Educational and Cultural Organization (ISESCO), and International Foundation for Science (IFS). COMSTECH has awarded USD 7.1925 million to 719 projects from 1998 until 2019.<sup>50</sup>

COMSTECH's goals are simple and well-articulated, but its scope, effectiveness, and viability are difficult to achieve and ensure. Efforts aimed at building sets of indigenous capabilities can be supported by inter-governmental endeavours to a certain extent. However, unless member states themselves compensate for their own deficiencies, form grassroots-based policies, and uphold professional merit, developing 'indigenous capabilities' would remain a pipe dream. The Muslim world shares a plethora of issues and core concerns, but the Pakistan-administered COMSTECH is limited in resources and the overseeing body, OIC, has not revised its strategy to face new realities and challenges of climate change and disruptive technologies. The OIC needs to translate these visible initiatives for development by institutionalizing the vast, but mostly unorganized, potential of charity-giving in Muslim societies. Every year, somewhere between USD 200 billion and USD 1 trillion are spent in mandatory alms and voluntary charity across the Muslim world.<sup>51</sup> While the conceptual framework is present, Pakistan needs to lead the process of institutionalizing charitable contributions at the operational and strategic levels. Unlike the technical arms of the UN, EU, or ASEAN, the OIC has the potential to channel spontaneous and rather unorganized charity into sustainable funds for technical and scientific initiatives.

Pakistan's position in regional and global politics within the Muslim world is critical, to say the least. Pakistan has economic and security agreements with many member states of the OIC. They are coupled with its strategic, cultural, and religious ties to, and affinities with, OIC countries. Pakistan has to pragmatically manoeuvre the fault lines and power blocs within and outside of the OIC in a bid to elicit strategic gains in a rapidly-changing world, one marked and marred by strategic shifts and vested interests. Pakistan needs to dovetail its geoeconomic agenda with its geostrategic and security interests, lest it risk losing diplomatic and political clout over the OIC.

The task of leveraging OIC to its advantage is going to be an onerous one for Pakistan. The changing power-equations, coupled with the fact that states have competing interests and are, thus, vying for strategic regional dominance at the expense of each other, present a package of challenges for Pakistan going forward. Navigating multifarious minefields will require Pakistan to not only be proactive but also to ensure that its policies are consistent yet flexible. With a view to using the OIC platform to garner benefits, Pakistan will need to strike a balance between looking at tactical exigencies and focusing on the ever-changing strategic environment.

## Endnotes

1. History and Charter of the OIC, OIC, [https://www.oic-oci.org/page/?p\\_id=52&p\\_ref=26&lan=en](https://www.oic-oci.org/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en)
2. The New Politics of Islam: Pan-Islamic Foreign Policy in a World of States (Routledge Islamic Studies Series), Naveed Sheikh, Page 16
3. History and Charter of the OIC, OIC, [https://www.oic-oci.org/page/?p\\_id=52&p\\_ref=26&lan=en](https://www.oic-oci.org/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en)
4. International Organizations: The politics and processes of global governance, Margaret P. Karns, Karen A. Mingset, Lynne Rienner Publishers, pg 340
5. Ibid Pg 343
6. Third Islamic Conference Of Foreign Ministers, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, OIC, <https://www.oic-oci.org/docdown/?docID=4402&refID=1235>
7. India's Saudi Policy: Bridge to the Future, P. R. Kumaraswamy, Md. Muddassir Quama, Pg 89
8. Third Islamic Conference Of Foreign Ministers, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, OIC, <https://www.oic-oci.org/docdown/?docID=4402&refID=1235>
9. Conflict Resolution in Muslim Societies: Role of the OIC, Abdullah al-Ahsan, Qur'anic Guidance for Good Governance, [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-319-57873-6\\_9](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-319-57873-6_9)
10. Role of the OIC in Conflict Resolution, Abdullah al-Ahsan, IIUM Journals, <https://journals.iium.edu.my/intdiscourse/index.php/id/article/download/268/259/547>
11. Fourth Islamic Conference Of Foreign Ministers, OIC, <https://www.oic-oci.org/docdown/?docID=4401&refID=1234>
12. Islamic Voice: Pakistan's Contribution In IGOs, The Case Study Of Organization Of Islamic Conference, Mahmood Ahmad, International Affairs Forum, <https://www.ia-forum.org/Files/SRPKCS.pdf>
13. Role of the OIC in Conflict Resolution, Abdullah al-Ahsan, IIUM Journals, <https://journals.iium.edu.my/intdiscourse/index.php/id/article/download/268/259/547>
14. Ibid
15. Pakistan and the OIC, Pakistan Horizon Vol. 37, No. 1 (First Quarter 1984), pp. 194-200, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41403916>
16. OIC's Conflict Resolution Approach: The Iran And Iraq War (1980-1988) As A Case Study, Saikou Kawsu Gassama, Mansoureh Ebrahimi, Kamaruzaman Bin Yusoff, International Journal of Asian Social Science, <http://www.aessweb.com/html/4157>
17. Ibid
18. Resolution 479 (1980), United Nations Digital Library System, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/16029?ln=en>
19. Islamic Voice: Pakistan's Contribution In IGOs, The Case Study Of Organization Of Islamic Conference, Mahmood Ahmad, International Affairs Forum, <https://www.ia-forum.org/Files/SRPKCS.pdf>
20. Conflict Resolution in Muslim Societies: Role of the OIC, Abdullah al-Ahsan, Qur'anic Guidance for Good Governance, <https://journals.iium.edu.my/intdiscourse/index.php/id/article/download/268/259/547>
21. Ibid

22. First Extraordinary Session Of The Islamic Conference Of Foreign Ministers, OIC, <https://ww1.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/All%20Download/frmex1.htm>
23. Ibid
24. Islamic Voice: Pakistan's Contribution In IGOs, The Case Study Of Organization Of Islamic Conference, Mahmood Ahmad, International Affairs Forum, <https://www.ia-forum.org/Files/SRPKCS.pdf>
25. Eleventh Islamic Conference Of Foreign Ministers, OIC, <https://ww1.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/11/11%20icfm-final-en.htm>
26. Fifteenth Islamic Conference Of Foreign Ministers, OIC, <https://ww1.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/15/15%20icfm-main.htm>
27. Twenty Second Islamic Conference Of Foreign Ministers, OIC, <https://ww1.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/22/resolution22-p.htm#07>
28. OIC's India venture: Diplomatic achievement for India?, Prof. Abdullahil Ahsan, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/oic-s-india-venture-diplomatic-achievement-for-india/1414645>
29. Organisation of The Islamic Conference and Conflict Resolution: Case Study of the Kashmir Dispute, Saira Bano Orakzai, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24711087>
30. Pakistan and the Organization of Islamic Conference, Saad S. Khan, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41394012>
31. Ibid
32. 20th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, OIC, <https://ww1.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/20/20%20icfm-political-en.htm>
33. 21st Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, OIC, <https://ww1.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/21/21-2nd%20%20resolution.htm#9/21-P>
34. Ibid
35. Islamic Voice: Pakistan's Contribution In IGOs, The Case Study Of Organization Of Islamic Conference, Mahmood Ahmad, International Affairs Forum, <https://www.ia-forum.org/Files/SRPKCS.pdf>
36. The Making of India: A Political History, Ranbir Vohra, The Decline of the Congress 1985-1996, Pg. 299
37. Special Declaration on Jammu & Kashmir, 7th session of the Islamic Summit Conference, OIC, <https://ww1.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/7/7th-is-summit.htm#SPECIAL%20DECLARATION%20ON%20JAMMU%20AND%20KASHMIR>
38. The Making of India: A Political History, Ranbir Vohra, The Decline of the Congress 1985-1996, Pg. 300
39. Final Communique of the 29th session of ICFM, OIC, <https://www.oicoci.org/docdown/?docID=4274&refID=1182>
40. 40th ICFM Resolution, MOFA Pakistan, <http://mofa.gov.pk/oic-resolutions/40th-conference-of-the-foreign-ministers>
41. 41st ICFM Resolutions, MOFA Pakistan, <https://mofa.gov.pk/41st-conference-of-the-foreign-ministers/>

42. 44th ICFM Resolution, MOFA Pakistan, <http://mofa.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/44thConference-of-the-Foreign-Ministers.pdf>
43. After 50 Years, India Invited to Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Plenary, the Wire, <https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-oic-plenary-invited>
44. Qureshi asks OIC to stop dragging feet on Kashmir meeting, Dawn News, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1572857>
45. Pakistanis pay price as Islamabad joins Turkey-Iran-Malaysia bloc, Asia Nikkei, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Pakistanis-pay-price-as-Islamabad-joins-Turkey-Iran-Malaysia-bloc>
46. Geopolitics & Diplomacy: India's Opportunities in the Pakistan-Saudi Rift, South Asian Voices, <https://southasianvoices.org/indias-opportunities-in-the-pakistan-saudi-rift/>
47. India-Gulf Migration: A Testing Time, MEI@75, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/india-gulf-migration-testing-time>
48. Cold War in the Islamic World, Dilip Hiro, Pg. 43, Hurst Publication
49. COMSTECH Contribution to S&T Capacity Building in OIC member states, COMSTECH, <https://comstech.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/capacity-building.pdf>
50. Ibid.
51. A faith-based Aid Revolution, the New Humanitarian, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/252069>