The United States-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue is a platform to manage the relationship at various levels. Notwithstanding mutual interests, there is deep-rooted suspicion and distrust of each other’s motives and intentions that has given rise to heightened expectations on both sides. While Nawaz Sharif’s government would like to prioritize expanding trade and investment cooperation between the two countries, other U.S. concerns might take priority in this latest round of dialogue.<!–more–>
While the United States is appreciative of Pakistan’s domestic counterterrorism efforts and the limited successes of Operation Zarb-e-Azb since June 2014, Washington remains skeptical of Islamabad’s strategy of using militant proxies to counter Indian influence in the region. A terrorist attack such as the January 2 assault on an Indian Air Force base in Pathankot diminishes Pakistan’s counterterrorism returns. Not only will it prove detrimental to future United States-Pakistan counterterrorism cooperation, but it may also damage the peace process between Pakistan and India. The United States has stated in unambiguous terms that it expects Pakistan to target militant groups operating from its territory conducting attacks in India. Pakistan should anticipate pressure during this latest round of talks to demonstrate its seriousness by dismantling proxy infrastructure.
Though the responsibility for the Pathankot attack was taken by the United Jihad Council (UJC)— an outfit comprised of several Kashmiri militant organizations—the knee-jerk reaction from India was to blame Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), a banned militant organization. Both JeM and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)—the latter being the outfit responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attack and the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament—are indirectly affiliated with the UJC. Therefore, Pakistan must take concrete steps to show the United States that its counterterrorism policy does not differentiate between good and bad militants.
Nuclear Safety and Security
Irrespective of the number of times Pakistani and U.S. officials relay their confidence in the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons infrastructure, skepticism remains.According to their recent joint statement, “The United States expressed full confidence in Pakistan’s indigenous efforts to strengthen nuclear security, and welcomed Pakistan’s efforts to strengthen export controls and border security […].” In Pakistan, this was hailed as a diplomatic success, whereby Islamabad’s efforts to harmonize its strategic trade controls with Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and other export control regimes were recognized and acknowledged.
However, despite this encouragement, it is unlikely that Pakistan’s pursuit of NSG membership on a criteria-based approach or a civilian nuclear deal with the United States will resonate with the U.S. policy community anytime soon. It is in Pakistan’s interest to gradually step away from seeking an India-like exemption for membership in the NSG, or a civilian nuclear deal similar to the Indo-U.S. agreement. The reason for this is two-fold: one, it derides Pakistan’s genuine desire for access to nuclear technology—that it has been denied for so long— as mere tit-for-tat nuclearism to match Indian engagements with the international community. Second, after having established a robust nuclear safety and security regime, achieving full-spectrum deterrence, and successfully inducting an assortment of strategic missiles, Pakistan needs to look inward. It should work towards sustainability of its nuclear force and credibility of its nuclear deterrent. In order to achieve these objectives, a peaceful domestic security environment is a must, which the United States will also see as a win.
What is heartening to note is that Pakistan has completed its interagency process and is ready to ratify the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM). The National Command Authority’s in-principle approval for ratification in its latest meeting will likely come up in the dialogue, and Pakistan might submit its instrument for ratification to the IAEA before or after this year’s final Nuclear Security Summit.
The Obama Administration plans to sell Pakistan eight F-16 fighter planes. However, Senator Bob Corker, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has expressed his intention to block the deal. Congressional and Indian reservations against the sale of F-16s to Pakistan will be trying for the outgoing administration, despite the Pentagon downplaying Indian concerns. Still, the administration remains determined as they believe the fighters are critical in assisting Pakistan’s counterterrorism operations. There is no doubt that this issue will be high on the agenda during the dialogue, and will be key for the outgoing administration to wrap up its eight-year ‘strategic’ partnership with Pakistan.
Coalition Support Funds (CSF) Post-U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan
Pakistan requested the United States to continue its support for the war on terrorism even after boots were taken off the ground. According to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), CSF provided to Pakistan for FY2014 was $1.2 billion and for FY 2015 was authorized up to $1 billion.
Consistent calls for the United States to revise, amend, or end aid and assistance to Pakistan have been made. However, Pakistan is still directly engaged in fighting terrorism, and has perhaps the biggest stake in pursuing peace in the region. Pursuing the Haqqani Network or fighting Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) inside Pakistani territory requires money. Pakistan should not place all its eggs in one basket and should not appear dependent on U.S. money and machines to fight its own war on terrorism. Pakistan needs to diversify aid channels and seek alternate funding sources, perhaps seeking more help from China. As U.S. boots exit the region, Pakistan needs to cut the umbilical cord to facilitate a process of independent growth it has not experienced in nearly two decades.
Both sides have immense stake in continuing the dialogue in good faith. Though obvious irritants, as discussed, will remain, both sides have the potential to overcome mutual differences, and work towards achieving their strategic objectives in South Asia.